- by Anna Rehm
Introduction
The country of Cameroon is currently experiencing intense violence due to an armed independence movement and the government’s response to it, with the roots of this conflict in colonialism and the undue influence of other nations on the region’s politics and governance. As a result of this conflict, a large-scale humanitarian crisis has developed in the country, with civilians trapped in the center of several armed groups. There is, however, a potential for Unarmed Civilian Protection/Accompaniment (UCP/A) to be effective in Cameroon. If done correctly, with the centering of local groups and interests, UCP/A could provide relief to the people of Cameroon and establish increased protection and security in areas of conflict. This paper will briefly outline the causes and history of the conflict in Cameroon, as well as the history and efficacy of UCP/A. It will then provide a brief analysis of the potential of UCP/A in Cameroon. This paper is not meant to be an authoritative source on any of the preceding topics, but aims to be an introduction and starting point for any organization interested in supporting UCP/A in Cameroon.
Background
In 1844, present-day Cameroon was colonized by Germany. However, after World War 1, the territory was partitioned by the League of Nations, and handed over to Britain and France for administration. The French-controlled territory was renamed French Cameroon, and was administered from the city of Yaoundé. The British-controlled territories of Northern
Cameroons and Southern Cameroons were administered from Nigeria (Okereke, 2022). French Cameroon gained independence on January 1, 1960, and became the Republic of Cameroon. In 1961, Northern and Southern Cameroons had separate plebiscites, as outlined by United Nations Resolutions 1350 and 1352. Both territories were given the option of independence through joining Nigeria or joining the Republic of Cameroon. The people of Northern Cameroons[1] [2] voted to join Nigeria, and the people of Southern Cameroons voted to join the Republic of Cameroon. Notably, independence separate from an existing country was not offered to either Northern or Southern Cameroons (Okereke, 2022).
In July of 1961, the Foumban Conference was held to outline the unification of Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon, referred to as West and East Cameroon, respectively. As a result, the Federal Republic of Cameroon was formed. However, this system of federalism was abandoned in 1972, and power was centralized in the hands of the president, while West Cameroon was annexed into the new political system in violation of the constitution that had been created in 1961 (Okereke, 2022).
Over the decades since the dissolution of the federal system, resentment simmered, and several complaints emerged, including, according to Shulika and Tella (2022):
the rigid legal system and school curriculum that disadvantaged the Anglophone minority . . . poor basic services delivery; the predominantly Francophone-led government’s non-adherence to and dissolution of the two-state federation agreement signed at independence in 1961; and overall underrepresentation of Anglophones in decision-making, especially in relation to the country’s political and socio-economic development. (p. 616-617)
In 2016, both teachers’ and lawyers’ unions took large-scale actions. The Anglophone Common Lawyers Association took issue with the gradual change of legal systems away from common law towards a French-inspired civil-law system, which the Association demanded be reversed in the Anglophone region, and the government’s failure to translate the “Organisation pour l’harmonisation en Afrique du droit des affaires” (OHADA) into English (Amin, 2021). In October, the Association announced an impending strike to begin on the 11th, but on the 10th, “government troops harassed and attacked them” (Amin, 2021, p. 99).
Teachers’ unions, including the Teachers Association of Cameroon and Cameroon Teachers Trade Union, began to support the lawyers and their strikes (Amin, 2021). As a result of this collaboration, the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium, or CACSC, was established in the country's Anglophone regions in December 2016. This consortium was led by the Anglophone teacher and lawyer unions, with demands including the preservation of Anglophone systems in Cameroon and a return to the federalist system. The consortium organized a series of strikes and sit-down protests, commonly called “Ghost Town,” beginning in December 2016. As a result of these protests, the Cameroon government made some concessions, including the hiring of bilingual teachers in English and French, but these concessions were ultimately unsuccessful in quelling the protests (Fon et al., 2022).
By December, a number of other groups had joined in the dissent. Notably, on November 28th, a strike began among the students at the University of Buea, who demanded better conditions and the payment of outstanding scholarships (Amin, 2021). The Vice Chancellor of the university invited military troops onto the campus, and these “troops brutalized, raped, and tortured students and dragged them to jail” (Amin, 2021, p. 100). However, due to the students’ access to technology and social media, evidence of these crimes was collected and distributed, and thus the students’ movement gained widespread support, especially among youth (Amin, 2021).
The lawyers’ and teachers’ strikes continued into 2017, even after the new school term was supposed to begin, due to negotiation failures. As such, schools remained closed, and the education system in Anglophone regions suffered. The government began arresting representatives of the groups leading the strike, including CACSC, and several groups, including CACSC, were banned (Amin, 2021). As a result, a number of organizations banded together to form the Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front in February 2017. On September 30th, the group created a constitution for an independent Southern Cameroon, named Ambazonia, and on October 1st, 2017, the group symbolically declared the region’s independence (Fon et al., 2022).
The Current Situation in Cameroon
In response to calls for the succession of Ambazonia, the government of Cameroon, led by President Biya, “has primarily adopted a military strategy that seeks to eliminate the secessionist forces and preserve the territorial integrity of the Cameroonian state” (Fon et al., 2022, p. 15). On the other hand, there are a large number of armed separatist groups. These are highly organized, and often coalesce and divide, meaning that the number and identity of these groups is fluid. They primarily use guerilla-style tactics to combat the Cameroon military, although inter-separatist conflicts are also common. Separatist groups have increased their use of weapons such as IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), which have led to civilian casualties and injuries (Amnesty International, 2023).
The conflict between all involved forces has created a large-scale humanitarian crisis throughout the Anglophone regions of Cameroon, with civilians caught in between the numerous armed groups. According to mid-2023 estimates by Human Rights Watch*, there are “over 638,000 internally displaced people across the Anglophone regions and at least 1.7 million people in need of humanitarian aid” across the country (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Specific abuses include attacks on schools by armed separatists, and government “counter-insurgency operations that often failed to protect civilians, or targeted them outright” (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Other abuses include abductions, election interference and manipulation, and the killing of journalists (Human Rights Watch, 2024). The government has engaged in unlawful killings of unarmed civilians and destruction of property. Armed groups have been known to target civil servants and schools, with attacks occurring on 489 secondary schools since 2018 (Amnesty International, 2023). The complexity of the situation and the number of forces involved in the conflict has created further issues. For instance, Mallinder claims that “Wary of being seen to take sides in a conflict that is becoming deadlier by the day, NGOs struggle to get food and medical assistance to those in need” (2019, p. 60). Ultimately, the situation in Cameroon, especially in the Anglophone regions, has become increasingly dangerous and dire.
An Introduction to Unarmed Civilian Protection/Accompaniment
Unarmed Civilian Protection and/or Accompaniment, or UCP/A, is a tactic that has been developed over several decades. As defined by Julian, “Unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) describes an approach, methodology and set of activities in which trained civilians protect other civilians from direct and immediate violence, using methods developed from nonviolence theory and practice” (2020, p. 102). There are many key elements of UCP (UCP/A). These include focus on local actors even when the protective force is made up of outsiders and nonpartisanship. UCP/A centers most often around the power of physical presence (Furnari, et al., 2023). According to the US-based organization Nonviolent Peaceforce*, UCP can take the form of:
protective accompaniment and protective presence, community-led safety and security initiatives such as early-warning early response mechanisms, civilians protecting one another through Women and Youth Protection Teams, conflict de-escalation techniques, civilian ceasefire and peace agreement monitoring, the establishment of weapons-free zones – and much more. (2022).
Any instance of UCP/A can take the form of one of these strategies, or a combination thereof, depending on the needs of the people living through the conflict.
UCP/A has been used in several instances and has been proven to be effective. In Mindanao in the Philippines, UCP/A has helped maintain a ceasefire, “and some armed actors agree that UCP has changed their actions and attitudes” (Julian, 2020, p. 106). UCP/A has also been used to create and maintain peaceful areas to minimize civilian displacement (Julian, 2020). In South Sudan, resulting from a partnership between International Non-Governmental Organizations and local communities, Women’s Protection Teams were formed and were successful in using UCP/A tactics to reduce the instances of assault against women (Gray, 2022). While the nature of armed conflicts makes it difficult to gauge quantitatively the effectiveness of UCP/A, there have been significant and diverse examples of UCP/A working to improve the quality of life of civilians.
The Potential of UCP/A in Cameroon
At present, the prospects for a resolution to the conflict in Cameroon are very negative. Between the government’s insistence on a military solution, the fragmentation of separatist groups, the inability of civil organizations to create peace, and a lack of international pressure, it seems unlikely that a mutually agreeable peace will be negotiated any time soon. There has only been one official discussion aiming at a resolution, held in late 2019. However, as this conversation excluded key players, especially important separatist leaders, and because the government has failed to implement a number of the agreed-upon reforms, no major improvement resulted from this meeting (Beseng et al., 2023). International involvement has also been minimal. As of February 2024, the only Western country that has become actively involved in negotiations is Switzerland, which abandoned its efforts in 2022. The UN and African Union have not become engaged, and Western countries such as the US (United States) have prioritized their economic interests over the well-being of civilians in Cameroon. Community-based organizations have been calling for peace, but with a lack of external support, this has been unsuccessful (Beseng et al., 2023). Without pressure from international organizations and other nations, it seems that the prospects for peace are minimal.
Noting the failure of combatant groups to negotiate an end to the conflict, the lack of international pressure on armed groups, and the improbability that these factors will change anytime soon, attention must be turned to aiding civilians caught in the crosshairs of this conflict. It is quite possible that UCP/A could play a role in this, as it has proven effective in other situations of conflict.
For any organization seeking to work in Cameroon, it is crucial that local populations are centered and their needs prioritized. One critical element of UCP/A is that local people “have paramount responsibility to create and sustain their own protection and nonviolent action strategies and mechanisms” (Furnari, et al., 2023, p.124). As such, international organizations should work to assist, as requested, Cameroonian-run groups, to support local efforts as opposed to importing their organizations. UCP/A in Cameroon, if it is to be effective, must be sustainable, and this sustainability will come not from efforts to continually send new, foreign peace teams, but from empowering local civilians to protect their own communities, through whatever means they deem necessary, whether it is financial resources, assistance in training, or any other form of support. The communities that are being impacted by violence need to be centered in any action taken in Cameroon.
Previous cases of successful UCP/A also highlight the need for local knowledge and expertise in creating effective protection initiatives. For example, Gray highlights that embedded knowledge is critical in identifying problems and adapting to dynamic situations and the context underlying them (2022, p. 327). However, it is critical that such knowledge and expertise is coupled with sufficient resources. In South Sudan, for example, initiatives were limited (although not ineffective) due to a lack of resources to expand and scale community-led UCP/A (Gray, 2022).
It is also crucial that any organization wishing to engage with UCP/A in Cameroon foreground relationships and community ties, whether they are directly engaging in UCP/A or supporting local organizations. Especially in active conflict zones, UCP/A has proven to be successful when relationships are formed between peace teams and would-be perpetrators of violence. For instance, according to Gray, there have been many successful instances of nonviolent peace teams de-escalating violence and conflict in South Sudan, especially when connections are prioritized (2022). In successful instances of UCP/A, “familiarity can be used as a means of protecting one’s friends, family, and neighbours” instead of being seen as a method of “saving strangers” (Gray, 2022, p. 315). When applied to the case of Cameroon, this means that organizations should work to build strong relationships with all members of society.
Conclusion
If conducted properly, UCP/A has a strong potential to help mitigate the violence endured by citizens of Cameroon. Any organization or group wishing to help engage in such initiatives should carefully consider past examples of successful UCP/A, and properly engage with the communities they are working with, whether the organization is located within Cameroon or based abroad. Furthermore, as UCP/A is a large umbrella, organizations must carefully determine which strategies would be most effective, working in tandem with local communities, in order to properly conduct UCP/A in Cameroon. However, if proper consideration and relationship-building are undertaken, UCP/A could be a powerful and meaningful tool for Cameroonians who are experiencing unsafe or violent situations as a result of the ongoing conflict in the country.
Works Cited
Amin, J. A. (2021). President Paul Biya and Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis: A Catalog of Miscalculations. Africa Today, 68(1), 95. https://doi.org/10.2979/africatoday.68.1.05
Beseng, M., Crawford, G., & Annan, N. (2023). From "Anglophone Problem" to "Anglophone Conflict" in Cameroon: Assessing Prospects for Peace. AFRICA SPECTRUM, 58(1), 89-105. https://doi.org/10.1177/00020397231155244
Cameroon: With or against us: People of the north-west region of Cameroon caught between the army, armed separatists and militias. Amnesty International. (2023, July 4). https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr17/6838/2023/en/
Fon, N. N. A., Formella, C. N., & Achu, N. N. (2022). A Tale of Two "Sisikus": The Evolving Trajectory of the Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon. Hungarian Journal of African Studies, 16(3), 3.
Furnari, E., Janzen, R., & Kabaki, R. (2023). Unarmed civilian protection: A new paradigm for protection and human security. Bristol University Press.
Gray, F. Relational R2P? Civilian-Led Prevention and Protection against Atrocity Crimes. Global Responsibility to Protect, 14(3), 313. https://doi.org/10.1163/1875-984X-20220007
Julian, R. (2020). The Transformative Impact of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping. Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations, 34(1), 99-111. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2019.1668361
Okereke, C. N. (2022). Imperial Antecedent of the Anglophone Conflict in Cameroon. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 23(1), 114.
Mallinder, L. (2019). License to kill. New Internationalist, 519, 60.
Shulika, L. S., & Tella, O. (2022). Cameroon's Anglophone crisis and the question of the right to self-determination. Round Table, 111(5), 612. https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2022.2131225
Unarmed civilian protection: An introduction. Nonviolent Peace Force. (n.d.). https://nonviolentpeaceforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/UCP_An-Introduction.pdf
World Report 2024: Rights trends in Cameroon. Human Rights Watch. (2024, January 11). https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/cameroon
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